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I. INTRODUCTION 
A flowchart belongs in a commercial outline. Why would any self-
respecting legal scholar write a symposium piece presenting one? Well, 
the Erie doctrine is different. First, it is very, very complicated. I have 
never seen an Erie flowchart in a commercial outline that did not have 
substantial errors or omissions. Academic treatment, for its part, tends to 
work in the weeds, without presenting the Erie doctrine in an organized 
and comprehensive way. What I offer below is, I think, the first correct 
and complete flowchart for Erie cases. 
Second, a properly formulated and sufficiently detailed flowchart, 
with accompanying explanations, can go a long way toward quieting 
academic worries that the Erie doctrine is fundamentally flawed. I hope 
to show that Erie problems are standard choice-of-law problems, and the 
way that the Supreme Court has told federal courts to deal with them is in 
keeping with that fact. Even the disagreements one sees on the Court are 
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Many thanks to the
participants in the University of Akron School of Law’s Conference on Erie at Eighty for helpful 
comments. 
1
Green: <i>Erie</i> Doctrine Flowchart
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
216 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:215 
just what one would expect given the nature of the choice-of-law 
problems at issue. The Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence isn’t perfect, 
but it largely makes sense. 
The third reason an Erie flowchart is worthy of academic treatment 
is that it helps highlight unexplored problems. Despite countless articles 
on Erie, there is a surprisingly large number of issues that have not been 
discussed in much detail. Identifying them is part of what I will try to do 
here. 
I begin by describing what I believe are the four considerations that 
come into play in an Erie problem. I then present the flowchart, followed 
by a lengthy explanation of each step. 
II. THE FOUR CONSIDERATIONS IN AN ERIE PROBLEM
First, some fundamentals. An Erie problem arises when a federal 
court facing an issue must choose between using a standard drawn from 
another sovereign’s law or using an independent federal standard. I 
believe there are four considerations that can come into play in the federal 
court’s choice. 
A. Sovereignty Considerations 
The first two considerations consist of reasons the federal court 
might have to use another sovereign’s standard. The first and most 
obvious of these is respect for the other sovereign’s lawmaking authority. 
Let us call these sovereignty considerations. 
Although the relevant sovereign is usually a state, it might be a 
foreign nation. Indeed, the place of foreign law in Erie problems is a big 
gap in the literature, which almost always speaks of Erie problems as if 
they exclusively involve the choice between federal and state legal 
standards.1 
An example of sovereignty considerations in action is Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins itself. In Erie, the Supreme Court held, in part, that a federal
district court in New York had to use Pennsylvania’s standard on the duty 
of care that a New York railroad has to a Pennsylvania trespasser in 
Pennsylvania, out of respect for Pennsylvania’s lawmaking authority.2 
Notice that if sovereignty considerations come into play, the other 
1. An exception is Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1531 (2011). For a response, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1485 (2013). Also unexplored is the role of the law of federal territories such as the District 
of Columbia or Guam, which derive their lawmaking power from the federal government.  
2. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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sovereign must want the federal court to use its standard to decide the 
issue (in the sense that the appropriate authorities of the other sovereign 
would, if asked, say they want that result). Thus, to understand Erie as 
being about respect for Pennsylvania’s sovereignty, we must assume that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have said it wanted a federal court 
facing the facts in Erie to use Pennsylvania’s standard. If it wouldn’t have 
said that—if the standard was intended to bind only Pennsylvania state 
courts—there would have been no assertion of Pennsylvania regulatory 
authority the federal court in Erie could have failed to respect. 
Although the terms “substantive” and “procedural” have many 
different meanings,3 a law can be called substantive if the sovereign that 
created it intends it to be used in other court systems and procedural if the 
sovereign intends it to be used only in its own courts. Unless otherwise 
noted, that is how I will use the terms here. Thus, one can say that 
sovereignty considerations are not implicated unless the other sovereign’s 
law is substantive in the relevant sense. 
One reason Erie problems are challenging is that it is so difficult to 
determine whether another sovereign’s law is substantive or procedural. 
Unless the question is certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, no 
Pennsylvania state court will have occasion to answer the question. 
Pennsylvania state courts are concerned only about what they should do, 
not what courts in other jurisdictions should do.4 
In addition to being almost always unanswered, substance/procedure 
questions are ubiquitous. Every time Pennsylvania law is made, the courts 
of other jurisdictions can ask whether the law is procedural only, freeing 
them to come up with their own standard for the matter. Since there will 
almost never be an answer, they will be forced to speculate or engage in 
the onerous process of certifying the question to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. 
Surprises concerning substance/procedure questions take two forms. 
First, a law can appear procedural, because it regulates court activity, but 
turn out to be substantive. An example of such a surprise would be if the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that it wants the courts of other legal 
systems to use Pennsylvania’s pleading rules when entertaining 
Pennsylvania actions or that it wants Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations 
to be used in other court systems whenever a party is a Pennsylvanian, 
even when the cause of action is under sister-state, federal, or foreign law. 
3. For a classic expression of this point, see Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 341–43 (1933). 
4. See generally Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845
(2013). 
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Second, a law can appear substantive, because it identifies the 
content of the cause of action upon which the plaintiff claims a right to 
relief,5 but turn out to be procedural. I have argued that the conflicting 
approaches in Erie6 and Swift v. Tyson7 were not motivated by 
disagreement about federal courts’ constitutional obligations or by 
jurisprudential disagreements about the nature of law but were the result 
of two different (and equally plausible) views about whether state court 
interpretations of the general common law prevailing in the state were 
substantive or procedural.8 Erie assumed that they were substantive (state 
supreme courts wanted federal courts to follow their interpretations) while 
Swift assumed that they were procedural (state supreme courts took the 
general common law standard prevailing in their state to be a question of 
fact about which federal courts could come to their own conclusion).9 If 
the question could have been certified to the relevant state supreme courts, 
the disagreement would have been quickly resolved, although the result 
would probably have been an Erie approach for some states and a Swift 
approach for others. 
It is important to recognize that substance/procedure questions are 
unique in being systematically unanswered. It is common, of course, for 
questions about the applicability of a jurisdiction’s law to certain facts to 
have not been answered by the jurisdiction’s courts, requiring the courts 
of other legal systems facing those facts to speculate or certify. For 
example, Pennsylvania courts may not have said anything about whether 
Pennsylvania negligence law applies to police officers when acting in the 
course of their duties. But these questions of scope can be, and often are, 
answered by the jurisdiction’s courts when they encounter the same facts. 
A Pennsylvania state court can get a negligence case brought against a 
police officer acting in the course of his duties. But there is a set of facts 
that a Pennsylvania state court will never be faced with—namely one 
where it is not a Pennsylvania state court but is instead a federal, or 
California, or German court. Since it never faces such facts, it never has a 
reason to speak about what should be done when they arise. Legislatures 
5. Or it identifies defenses to the action that remove liability. In what follows I will speak of
the content of a cause of action without adding this qualification. 
6. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
7. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
8. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1120–27 
(2011). 
9. In Erie’s Suppressed Premise, I offer an account of why the Supreme Court in Erie could 
require federal courts to follow state court decisions concerning the general common law prevailing 
in the state even if the state courts themselves did not take them to be binding. Id. at 1136–54. I ignore 
that argument here.  
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will also rarely speak of the substantive or procedural character of their 
laws, treating the question as just one of the many choice-of-law problems 
that they leave to the courts. 
Notice that substance/procedure questions concerning federal law 
are not systematically unanswered, because appeals from state courts to 
the United States Supreme Court can occur. Through the mechanism of 
appeal, the Supreme Court has made it clear that its interpretations of 
federal law are binding on state courts.10 And it has answered many 
questions about whether other federal laws are substantive or procedural 
when state courts entertain federal causes of action.11 
Unanswered substance/procedure questions bedevil Erie problems. 
Much of the disagreement between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.12 concerned 
a substance/procedure question about New York law: whether New York 
wants federal courts entertaining New York statutory damages actions to 
use section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law, which prohibits 
statutory damages actions from being brought as a class.13 No New York 
court had—or ever would have—occasion to answer the question and the 
Supreme Court (curiously) did not think to certify the question to the New 
York Court of Appeals. 
This problem of determining whether another sovereign’s law is 
substantive or procedural is not confined to Erie problems. It is also faced 
by state courts and the courts of foreign nations when they try to determine 
whether they should use another sovereign’s law to decide an issue. 
Indeed, the very same problem of whether section 901(b) is substantive 
or procedural was faced by a Connecticut state court when it considered 
entertaining New York statutory damages actions as a class.14 In involving 
substance/procedure questions, Erie problems are standard choice-of-law 
problems, just like those faced by state or foreign courts. 
There are three general approaches to substance/procedure questions 
that courts tend to take, each with its advantages and disadvantages. The 
10. E.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
11. E.g., Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915) (burdens of proof); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915) (time bar). Foreign courts, by contrast, are still in the dark, 
for the Supreme Court has no occasion to say what they should do. 
12. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
13. Compare id. at 428–37 (Stevens, J., concurring) with id. at 451–57 (Ginsburg, J,
dissenting). Another example is Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), in 
which Justices Scalia and Ginsburg came to different conclusions about whether New York’s standard 
for reviewing a jury’s award of damages as excessive was substantive or procedural. Compare id. at 
429 (featuring Ginsburg arguing that it is substantive), with id. at 463–68 (featuring Scalia arguing 
that it is procedural). 
14. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 826–27 (Conn. 2007). 
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first is to apply forum law whenever the issue faced can be characterized 
as concerning the means by which causes of action are to be litigated. 
Forum law applies to all these issues, even if one might understand 
another jurisdiction’s law concerning the issue to be substantive. The 
main benefit of the forum-law approach is that it dramatically reduces the 
number of substance/procedure questions a court must face. 
The forum-law approach was, by and large, the traditional one used 
by courts.15 The only exceptions were a small set of issues that could be 
characterized as concerning the means of litigating causes of action—
including statutes of limitations and burdens of proof—where another 
jurisdiction’s law on the issue might be used if it was interpreted as bound 
up with the cause of action.16 In this narrow set of cases, the forum had to 
speculate about whether the other jurisdiction’s law was substantive or 
procedural. But most substance/procedure questions were avoided 
entirely, including all questions of whether a third jurisdiction, different 
from the forum and the one that created the cause of action, might want 
its law to extend to an issue. For example, a California court entertaining 
a Nevada action would apply California’s attorney-client privilege law to 
communications between an Oregon attorney and her Oregon client in 
Oregon, even though Oregon could be understood as wanting its law to 
apply. 
One possible justification for the forum-law approach is that even if 
another jurisdiction’s law is substantive, the forum also likely has a 
legitimate interest in its procedural law being used, and any conflicts can 
be decided in the forum’s favor. But the actual justification for the 
traditional approach was a rigidly territorial division of lawmaking 
authority, in which conflicts between forum law and the law of another 
jurisdiction were largely impossible. The forum state was understood as 
having the sole power to regulate the means by which causes of action 
were litigated in its courts, because the courts’ activities were within its 
borders. To describe an issue faced by a court as concerning the means of 
litigating a cause of action meant that forum law was the only one that 
could apply.17 By the same token, the sovereign where the cause of action 
arose had the sole power to determine its content. 
Modern approaches in the conflict of laws reject this sharp division 
of lawmaking power. Lawmaking power is now thought to be concurrent 
15. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 586–600 (1934). 
16. E.g., id. §§ 599, 605. 
17. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 165 (1916); Michael 
S. Green, Legal Monism: An American History, in Christoph Bezemek, Michael Potacs and Alexander 
Somek (eds.), VIENNA LECTURES ON LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 23, 32–40 (2018). 
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rather than exclusive.18 Even if a jurisdiction’s law regulates court 
activity, rather than defining the right upon which a plaintiff sues, it is 
possible that it legitimately extends to other court systems. To find out 
whether another jurisdiction’s law actually extends to an issue, a court 
must do its best to discern whether the relevant authorities of the other 
jurisdiction would say they want their law to apply. The benefit of this 
scrupulous approach is greater sensitivity to the sovereignty interests at 
play in choice-of-law cases. Its main disadvantage is difficulty of 
application, given that there will be no direct information from the other 
jurisdiction’s courts on the matter. 
The third approach is to adopt some easily-applied test to decide, in 
a rough-and-ready way, whether a law should be treated as substantive or 
procedural without detailed inquiry into the intent of the particular 
lawmakers at issue. Let us call this the rule-of-thumb approach. The rules 
of thumb used are varied, but they all seek to capture sovereignty interests 
more accurately than the forum-law approach but at less administrative 
cost than the scrupulous approach.19 
Indeed, one can characterize both Swift and Erie as using a rule-of-
thumb approach to a substance/procedure problem. Swift adopted the view 
that all states considered their interpretations of the general common law 
prevailing in their borders to be procedural, whereas Erie adopted the 
view that they all considered them to be substantive. Each was largely 
accurate for its time but missed nuances that a scrupulous jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction approach might have caught, for there were probably some 
Erie states when Swift was decided20 and some Swift states when Erie was 
decided.21 
Each of these three approaches—the forum-law approach, the 
scrupulous approach, and the rule-of-thumb approach—can be found in 
state courts facing substance/procedure questions. And because Erie 
problems sometimes involve substance/procedure questions too, one can 
find advocates for each on the Court. 
18. Green, supra note 17, at 40–48; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313
(1981). 
19. See, e.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) (adopting a rule of thumb in determining
whether a statute of limitations is substantive or procedural). 
20. Connecticut is a possibility. See Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388, 407 (1836); Green, supra 
note 8, at 1124. 
21. Georgia is a possibility. See Slaton v. Hall, 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929); Green, supra 
note 8, at 1123. 
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B. Borrowing Considerations 
The second reason a federal court might use a standard drawn from 
another sovereign’s law is that it serves federal regulatory purposes. 
Because federal interests stand behind the use of the other sovereign’s 
standard, one should describe the law that is applied as federal. A standard 
from another sovereign’s law is incorporated into federal law. Let us 
therefore call these borrowing considerations. 
For an example of borrowing considerations in action, consider 
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.22 A Mississippi statute required non-
Mississippi corporations to register to do business in Mississippi before 
bringing a lawsuit “in any of the courts of this state.”23 The Erie problem 
was whether a federal court sitting in diversity in Mississippi should use 
the same standard. The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing Mississippi state 
court decisions, concluded that the phrase “courts of this state” referred 
only to Mississippi state courts.24 But the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Mississippi standard should be used in federal court anyway. The 
reason could not be respect for Mississippi’s lawmaking power—by 
hypothesis, Mississippi officials didn’t care whether the standard was 
used in federal court. Their rule was procedural. Using the standard must 
instead have served some federal interest.25 
Failure to distinguish between sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations is the main reason that the Erie doctrine appears so 
puzzling to academics and judges.26 If one assumes that the only reasons 
to use state standards are sovereignty considerations, the Supreme Court’s 
Erie jurisprudence looks deviant. Deference to state interests is much 
more than one would expect. But when borrowing considerations are 
added, the puzzle disappears. 
Part of the problem is ambiguity concerning the word “law.” On the 
one hand, “choosing Mississippi law” might mean giving a matter over to 
Mississippi’s lawmaking authority. That did not happen in Woods. On the 
other hand, the phrase might be used more broadly to mean using a 
standard that is in Mississippi law, even when the reason one uses the 
standard has nothing to do with Mississippi’s regulatory interests. That is 
what took place in Woods. To avoid confusion, I will generally speak of 
22. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
23. Id. at 536 n.1. 
24. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1948). 
25. The Woods court described this interest as avoiding “discriminations against citizens of the 
State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Woods, 
337 U.S. at 538. 
26. For an example, see Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2016). 
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a federal court applying state or foreign standards (and thus say that 
Mississippi’s standard was applied in Woods) and will say that state or 
foreign law is applied only when the reason is sovereignty considerations. 
But deference to linguistic convention will sometimes force me to use the 
word “law” when I mean standard, for example, when I speak of Erie 
problems as concerning “choice of law.” Speaking of them as “choice of 
standard” problems, although sometimes more accurate, just sounds too 
odd. 
Another source of confusion is the way that the terms “substantive” 
and “procedural” are used (or misused) in Erie cases. In Erie parlance, the 
Mississippi statute in Woods would be described as “substantive.”27 But 
that wrongly suggests that sovereignty considerations stood behind its use 
in federal court—that Mississippi officials wanted the federal court in 
Woods to use their standard. The Supreme Court didn’t care what 
Mississippi officials wanted. The Mississippi standard was used for 
federal reasons. 
That sovereignty and borrowing considerations are distinct is evident 
when they point to different jurisdictions. As implausible as it may seem, 
in 2017 the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the state’s commitment to 
a Swiftian view of the common law.28 If a Georgia state court gets a 
common law case that arises in Alabama, it will come to its own 
conclusion about what the common law standard prevailing in Alabama 
is.29 What should a federal court sitting in diversity in Georgia do when 
entertaining a common law case that arises in Alabama? Sovereignty 
considerations recommend that it follow the decisions of the Alabama 
Supreme Court.30 According to the vertical borrowing considerations at 
play in Erie problems, by contrast, it should interpret Alabama law the 
way a Georgia state court would.31 
Of course, there is a good argument that Georgia’s approach is 
unconstitutional. A less extreme example of sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations pointing to different jurisdictions occurs when the forum 
27. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Windy City Metal
Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
28. Coon v. The Medical Ctr., Inc., 797 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. 2017). 
29. This apparently applies to all common law cases, not just cases that would be described as 
concerning the general common law during the Swift era. 
30. Although the Alabama Supreme Court has never had occasion to say whether its
interpretations of the common law prevailing in Alabama are substantive, we can safely assume that 
it thinks they are. 
31. Federal courts in Georgia appear to have privileged borrowing considerations over
sovereignty considerations. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir. 
1987); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 677 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Briggs & Stratton Corp. 
v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343–44 (M.D. Ga. 1999). 
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state makes the constitutionally permissible choice of its own law even 
though another jurisdiction is more interested in its law applying.32 
Vertical borrowing considerations recommend forum law, while the 
weight of sovereignty considerations recommend the other jurisdiction’s 
law. 
In Klaxon, the Supreme Court decided this conflict between vertical 
borrowing considerations and the weight of sovereignty considerations in 
favor of the former.33 A federal court sitting in diversity should use the 
choice-of-law rules of the forum state. I will discuss whether Klaxon was 
rightly decided later.34 But it is worth noting that with Klaxon in place, 
the sovereignty considerations that a federal court is permitted to consider 
in an Erie problem cannot point to a different jurisdiction’s law than 
borrowing considerations do (provided that the forum state’s approach is 
constitutional). If a New York state court would favor New York’s 
interests over Pennsylvania’s interests and so apply New York law, a 
federal court in New York facing an Erie problem can take into account 
only sovereignty considerations in favor of applying New York law. But 
even with Klaxon in place, the distinction between borrowing and 
sovereignty considerations remains essential. Borrowing considerations 
will recommend that a federal court in New York use a New York 
standard when sovereignty considerations are utterly absent—when New 
York officials do not care whether the standard is used in federal court. 
Although borrowing considerations are particularly important in Erie 
problems, they have a recognized place in other choice-of-law contexts as 
well. Consider a California state court entertaining a Nevada cause of 
action. The plaintiff has waited two and a half years to sue. Which 
limitations period should the court use—the three-year period in 
California’s statute of limitations or Nevada’s two-year limitations 
period? Assuming that Nevada’s limitations period is substantive, in the 
sense that Nevada officials want the California state court to use their 
period, the court might use it out of respect for Nevada’s lawmaking 
power. This is an example of sovereignty considerations in action. But 
even if Nevada officials don’t care whether the California court uses their 
limitations period, the court might use it anyway because that keeps 
plaintiffs from seeking out California state court solely to take advantage 
of California’s longer limitations period. This is an example of borrowing 
considerations in action. 
32. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
33. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
34. See infra Explanation of Question 10.
10
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C. Countervailing Considerations 
In contrast to these two reasons to use another sovereign’s standard 
to decide an issue, there are federal interests in favor of using an 
independent federal standard. I will call these countervailing 
considerations,35 because they can recommend a standard that is different 
from the competing state or foreign law—even though the federal 
standard might, by chance, be the same as the other sovereign’s. 
The following is an example of countervailing considerations’ being 
decisive in an Erie problem. Assume that under the federal standard of 
forum non conveniens a federal court entertaining some foreign cause of 
action should dismiss it so it can be entertained by a foreign court. A 
forum state court would retain the action. Because the difference between 
the federal and forum state standards will motivate forum shopping, 
vertical borrowing considerations recommend using the forum state 
standard. But federal courts facing such Erie problems have uniformly 
concluded that the federal standard should be used.36 Some countervailing 
considerations to which they have appealed to justify this conclusion are 
federal interests in foreign relations and the difficulty the federal court 
would face interpreting foreign law and getting access to foreign 
witnesses. 
Notice that a federal court balancing borrowing considerations 
against countervailing considerations is balancing one type of federal 
interest against another. The law the court applies is federal and the issue 
is solely whether this federal law should borrow a standard from another 
sovereign’s law or use an independent federal standard. On the other hand, 
a federal court balancing sovereignty considerations against 
countervailing considerations is trying to determine whether the law of 
another sovereign or federal law should be applied.37 
Countervailing considerations obviously have their analogue in state 
court. Consider our California state court entertaining a Nevada cause of 
action. The plaintiff has waited two and a half years to sue. Sovereignty 
and borrowing considerations can recommend using Nevada’s two-year 
limitations period. But countervailing considerations can argue in favor of 
35. Here I am following the language in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 
356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
36. See 14D CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828.5
(2009). 
37. Sometimes both sovereignty and borrowing considerations recommend another
sovereign’s standard, in which case the standard could be described as the law of the other sovereign 
and as federal law. There is no need to choose between descriptions, since federal law and the law of 
the other sovereign have the same content. 
11
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using California’s three-year limitations period. The period is an 
expression of California’s regulatory policies concerning when plaintiffs 
have waited too long to sue (such as when evidence is stale or plaintiffs 
have waived their rights) and the California court could favor these 
California policies over any California policies in favor of borrowing the 
Nevada period and over any Nevada policies in favor of applying Nevada 
law. 
D. Separation-of-Powers Considerations 
To repeat, the first three considerations in Erie problems consist of 
reasons for a federal court to use a standard drawn from another 
sovereign’s law (sovereignty and borrowing considerations) and reasons 
for it to use an independent federal standard (countervailing 
considerations). So far we have assumed that federal courts are free to 
answer Erie problems as they see fit, without their decisions being 
constrained or influenced by the decisions of other federal actors. But that, 
of course, isn’t the case. The fourth type of consideration concerns how 
federal courts’ reasoning in an Erie problem is constrained or influenced 
by federal enacted law, whether it is a provision of the U.S. Constitution, 
a federal statute, or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Let us call 
these separation-of-powers considerations. 
Of particular importance in Erie problems is determining whether 
federal enacted law has already answered the Erie problem in favor of a 
federal standard, forcing the federal court to give priority to 
countervailing considerations over sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations. One of the most difficult issues in Erie problems is 
deciding whether a federal court’s hands have been tied in this fashion. It 
is also possible for federal enacted law to compel the federal court to apply 
state or foreign law, privileging sovereignty or borrowing considerations 
over countervailing considerations.38 
If a federal court’s hands are not tied, in the sense that it is not 
following the mandate of some federal enacted law in answering the Erie 
problem, then its decision can be described as a form of common law 
reasoning. Notice that even then its reasoning can be influenced by federal 
enacted law. In particular, federal enacted law can play a role in 
generating some of the countervailing or borrowing considerations that 
the federal court takes into account. 
38. As we shall see, the Supreme Court has understood the U.S. Constitution as compelling
federal courts to favor sovereignty considerations in certain circumstances. See infra Explanation of 
Question 9. 
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Separation-of-powers considerations also have their analogue in 
state court. Our California court deliberating about whether to apply 
Nevada’s or California’s limitations period might find that it is compelled 
to apply California’s limitations period because the California state 
legislature has told it to do so. Or the legislature might have enacted a 
borrowing statute that compels the court to use Nevada’s limitations 
period, thereby favoring borrowing considerations. The separation-of-
powers considerations one sees in Erie problems are not unique to that 
context. To sum up, Erie problems arise when federal courts facing an 
issue must choose between an independent federal standard and a standard 
drawn from another sovereign’s law. In making this choice, they can take 
into account sovereignty considerations (does the other sovereign wish its 
standard to be used?), borrowing considerations (are there federal reasons 
to use the other sovereign’s standard?), and countervailing considerations 
(are there federal reasons to use an independent federal standard?). 
Furthermore, how the court takes these factors into account can be 
constrained and influenced by federal enacted law, that is, by separation-
of-powers considerations. In considering sovereignty, borrowing, and 
countervailing considerations, subject to the restraints of separation-of-
powers considerations, Erie problems look like normal choice-of-law 
problems faced by other courts. 
Now for the flowchart, followed by a lengthy discussion of each step. 
13
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II: THE FLOWCHART 
Q. 1 
Is the case before a federal court? Yes
Q. 2 
Is the federal court entertaining 
an action under non-federal law? 
No 
There is no Erie 
problem for the 
court to address. 
The state court 
faces a choice-of-
law problem or, if it 
is entertaining a 
federal cause of 
action and is 
determining 
whether a federal 
standard or an 
independent 
standard under its 
own law should be 
used, a reverse-Erie 
problem. 
No
There is no Erie 
problem to address. 
All issues of court 
administration are 
governed by federal 
law. Any laws that 
states or foreign 
nations want to be 
used in federal 
court are 
preempted. 
Occasionally federal 
law might borrow 
standards from the 
forum state out of 
convenience, but 
such borrowing is 
not due to a federal 
policy of vertical 
uniformity. Any 
duty to ensure 
vertical uniformity 
rests on state courts 
when they entertain 
federal actions.
Yes
Identify the issue faced by 
the federal court. 
Q. 3 
Is the use of an 
independent federal 
standard for the issue 
demanded by the U.S. 
Constitution? 
Yes 
Use the 
independent 
federal standard. 
No 
Q. 4 
Is the use of an independent 
federal standard for the issue 
demanded by a federal 
statute? This will be the case 
if the statute is “sufficiently 
broad to cover the point in 
dispute.” Notice that the 
federal statute might direct 
federal courts to come up 
with an independent federal 
common law standard for the 
issue by considering relevant 
federal interests. 
Yes 
Q. 5 
Is the issue rationally classifiable 
as procedure? This is probably the 
case if it can be characterized as 
concerning the means by which the 
non-federal action is enforced in 
federal court. 
No No Yes 
14
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Use the standard 
that the state or 
foreign nation 
that created the 
cause of action 
wishes to be used 
in federal court. 
Congress is trying 
to determine the 
content of a non-
federal action. It 
cannot do this 
using its power to 
regulate the 
procedure of 
federal courts.  
Q. 6 
Is the use of an independent 
federal standard for the 
issue demanded by a 
FRCP? The Supreme Court 
has not provided consistent 
guidance on this matter. 
The official test is whether 
the plain meaning of a 
FRCP creates a direct 
collision with the 
competing state standard. 
This suggests that a FRCP 
cannot direct federal courts 
to create an independent 
federal common law 
standard. But there is 
evidence suggesting 
otherwise. It also suggests 
that the scope of the FRCP 
should not be read with 
sensitivity to state interests. 
But there is evidence 
suggesting otherwise. 
No 
Yes 
Q. 7 
Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure? (see Q. 5) 
No 
Y
e
s 
Q. 9 
Is there a state or foreign 
standard bound up with the 
cause of action upon which the 
plaintiff sues? In other words, 
does the sovereign that created 
the cause of action want its 
standard for the issue to be 
used by a federal court 
entertaining its action? It is 
unclear what method should be 
used to determine this.
Yes 
No to 
Q. 4 
No to 
Q. 5 
Yes to 
Q. 5 
Use the standard that the state 
or foreign nation that created 
the cause of action wishes to 
be used in federal court. The 
Supreme Court is trying to 
use a FRCP to determine the 
content of a non-federal 
action. It cannot do this using 
the power to regulate the 
procedure of federal courts 
that Congress delegated to it 
in the Rules Enabling Act.  
Use the independent 
federal standard. 
Congress has decided 
to preempt any 
standards that states 
or foreign nations 
wish to be used in 
federal court. It has 
also decided that 
using an independent 
federal standard is 
more important than 
any federal policy of 
vertical uniformity. If 
the statute directs 
federal courts to 
create an independent 
federal common law 
standard, the court 
should create that 
standard on the basis 
of relevant federal 
interests without 
taking into account 
any policy of vertical 
uniformity. 
No 
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Q. 8 
Does the way the FRCP regulates the issue 
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive state 
or foreign rights? Scalia’s approach to this 
question is to consider only whether the 
FRCP can be understood as regulating the 
means by which preexisting non-federal 
causes of action are litigated in federal court. 
Ginsburg’s and Stevens’s approaches would 
look to whether the state or foreign nation 
that created the cause of action wishes its 
standard for the issue to follow its cause of 
action into federal court. The 
Ginsburg/Stevens approach is probably 
controlling. Ginsburg recommends a 
searching inquiry into whether the state or 
foreign nation that created the cause of 
action wishes its standard to be used. 
Stevens recommends using a rule of thumb: 
if the standard is in a nominally procedural 
code, the state or foreign nation will be 
presumed to be not interested in its standard 
being used in federal court. Stevens’s 
method is probably controlling. Whether 
other sovereigns who did not create the 
cause of action wish their standards to be 
used by the federal court is irrelevant. The 
FRCP preempts these state and foreign laws. 
No 
to 
Q.
9 
Yes to 
Q. 7 
Yes 
to 
Q. 9 
Yes No 
Use the independent federal standard in 
the FRCP. The Supreme Court, using 
Congress’s power, has decided to 
preempt any contrary standards that 
states or foreign nations wish to be used 
in federal court. It has also decided that 
using an independent federal standard is 
more important than any federal policy 
of vertical uniformity. If the FRCP 
directs federal courts to create an 
independent federal common law 
standard, the court should create that 
standard on the basis of relevant federal 
interests without taking into account any 
policy of vertical uniformity. 
Use the 
relevant state 
or foreign 
standard. The 
Supreme Court 
is violating the 
limits imposed 
on FRCPs in 
the Rules 
Enabling Act. 
Use the 
relevant state 
or foreign 
standard. It is 
possible, 
however, that 
a state or 
foreign 
nation cannot 
displace 
federal 
common law 
on an 
insignificant 
issue by 
binding up a 
standard on 
the issue with 
its action. 
16
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Q. 10 
Do the purposes standing behind the statute 
granting the federal court jurisdiction generate 
policies of vertical uniformity with the state 
court where the non-federal action would have 
been brought but for federal jurisdiction? In 
diversity cases, there are two such policies. 
First, a federal court should seek to create 
vertical uniformity so that a party worried 
about state court bias will not be discouraged 
from going to federal court by disadvantageous 
federal law. Uniformity will also keep a party 
not worried about state court bias from going to 
federal court solely because of advantageous 
federal law. Second, independently of avoiding 
forum shopping, a federal court should 
recognize that Congress created diversity 
jurisdiction to provide a federal forum free of 
the bias that might exist in state court—not to 
license it to create federal common law for 
administering non-federal actions in the light of 
any conceivable federal interest. Presumptively 
the federal common law standard it uses should 
be the same as that used in state court. If it 
violates this command, the party disadvantaged 
is being treated differently from someone in a 
state court, for no valid reason. The federal 
court is therefore inequitably administering the 
laws. The existence, nature, and strength of 
policies of vertical uniformity in connection 
with other jurisdictional statutes may be 
different. 
 
No to 
Q. 9 
The federal 
court is in the 
common law or 
“relatively 
unguided” Erie 
track. The 
interests of 
states or foreign 
nations in their 
laws’ being used 
for the issue are 
no longer a 
consideration at 
this point. The 
law applied to 
the issue will be 
federal common 
law. The 
question is 
solely whether 
that law should 
borrow the 
standard that 
would be used 
by the state 
court where the 
action would 
have been 
brought but for 
federal 
jurisdiction or 
whether it 
should consist of 
an independent 
federal standard. 
No
Use an independent federal common 
law standard arrived at by considering 
relevant federal interests (excluding 
any policy of vertical uniformity). 
Yes 
Q. 11 
Is one of the reasons Congress created federal jurisdiction for 
the non-federal action an opposition to the standard that state 
courts would apply to the issue?  
No 
Yes 
Use an independent federal common law standard arrived at 
by considering relevant federal interests (excluding any policy 
of vertical uniformity). 
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No to 
Q. 11 
Q. 12 
Can one identify the state court where the non-federal action would likely have 
been brought but for federal jurisdiction? 
No 
Use an independent federal common law standard arrived at 
by considering relevant federal interests (excluding any 
policy of vertical uniformity). 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Q. 13 
Identify the standard that would be used by that state court. Then identify the 
independent federal common law standard that would be used by the federal court in 
the absence of any policies of vertical uniformity. In some cases, this standard will 
simply be an unspoken practice of not following the standard used in the relevant state 
court. If the independent federal common law standard for the issue is a matter of first 
impression, the federal court will have to create a candidate standard. Then ask: is the 
difference between the two standards so significant that the federal court’s use of the 
independent federal standard would violate federal policies recommending vertical 
uniformity? In connection with diversity cases the questions are: (1) whether the 
difference is so significant that it would cause ex ante forum shopping between 
federal and state court and (2) whether the use of the federal standard in federal court 
would be the inequitable administration of the laws.  
Use the independent federal common law standard. 
Q. 14 
Are there sufficiently strong countervailing federal interests in favor of the 
independent federal standard, interests that would overcome federal policies in 
favor of vertical uniformity? 
Use the independent federal 
common law standard.  
Yes No 
Use the standard that would be used by the 
state court where the action would otherwise 
have been brought.  
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III. EXPLANATIONS
With the flowchart presented, let us now consider each step in greater 
detail. 
Question 1: Is the case before a federal court? 
If the case is not before a federal court, then there is no Erie problem 
to answer. In a sense, this is true only by stipulation. Erie problems are 
simply defined as concerning whether a federal court should use a 
standard drawn from another sovereign’s law or an independent federal 
standard.39 If the question is whether a state court should use a standard 
drawn from another sovereign’s law or an independent standard from its 
own law, then the problem the court faces is not called an Erie problem, 
even if it is similar to an Erie problem in other respects. 
As we have seen, all the considerations faced by federal courts in 
Erie problems—sovereignty, borrowing, countervailing, and separation-
of-powers—have their analogues in state court. It is true that vertical 
borrowing considerations are unique to Erie cases and are generally more 
significant than the horizontal borrowing considerations faced by state 
courts. A federal court in California has more reasons to borrow standards 
used by California state courts than a California state court has to borrow 
standards from sister-state or foreign courts. The fact remains that 
borrowing considerations can arise in state court too. Erie problems are, 
in their essentials, like any other choice-of-law case. 
But even though state courts face problems similar to Erie problems, 
they are not called “Erie” problems. They are called “choice-of-law” 
problems or (if the state court is entertaining a federal cause of action and 
is trying to determine whether it should use a federal standard or a 
standard from its own law) “reverse-Erie” problems. 
Question 2: Is the federal court entertaining an action under non-
federal law? 
If the only action a federal court is entertaining is under federal law, 
then it is usually said that there is no Erie problem for the court to answer. 
This is puzzling, for such a court can still legitimately ask whether an issue 
should be decided using a standard from another sovereign’s law. In doing 
39. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010). 
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so, sovereignty, borrowing, countervailing, and separation-of-powers 
considerations can come into play. 
Let us start with sovereignty considerations. It is true that if the 
plaintiff is suing under federal law, the question of whether there should 
be deference to another sovereign’s lawmaking power concerning the 
content of the cause of action has already been answered in the negative. 
It is federal law—rather than state law or foreign law—that is being 
applied. But another sovereign might be legitimately interested in 
regulating an issue related to how the federal cause of action is litigated 
in federal court. Assume that an Oregon lawyer and her Oregon client 
have a conversation in Oregon. The conversation is relevant to a case 
brought under federal law in federal court. Oregon can have an interest in 
its attorney-client privilege law being used, forcing the federal court to 
weigh these sovereignty considerations against countervailing 
considerations in favor of federal attorney-client privilege law, unless (as 
is in fact the case40) separation-of-powers considerations force the federal 
court’s hands. Another example is a foreign nation that wants its statute 
of limitations to be used by a federal court entertaining a federal cause of 
action, because a party to the action is a domiciliary. 
That said, federal courts appear to assume that federal law trumps the 
law of any state or foreign nation that is interested in regulating how a 
federal cause of action is litigated in federal court.41 Thus, it appears that 
federal courts have adopted the forum-law approach to 
substance/procedure questions that arise concerning questions of court 
administration in federal question cases. 
Not only are sovereignty considerations ignored in federal question 
cases, so are the vertical borrowing considerations that are so important 
when federal courts sitting in diversity entertain actions under non-federal 
law. Although federal courts entertaining federal causes of action will 
sometimes borrow standards from the forum state for issues of court 
administration,42 this is for reasons of convenience, not because there is a 
federal policy of vertical uniformity. One might wonder why no federal 
policy of vertical uniformity exists in federal question cases. If the federal 
cause of action can be entertained by both federal and state courts, there 
40. Under Fᴇᴅ. R. Eᴠɪᴅ. 501, federal privilege law should be used in federal question cases. 
41. For example, in Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of Am. 
(UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966), the Court treated the question 
of the limitations period to use when a federal statute lacks one to be a matter of federal law, even 
when a state statute of limitations is borrowed. 
42. The most obvious example is federal courts’ borrowing limitations periods from forum 
state law for federal statutes. See, e.g., id. at 703–04. 
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is arguably a federal interest in avoiding forum shopping—in ensuring 
that the choice of a federal forum is for the right reasons, not simply to 
take advantage of some difference in standards of court administration 
between federal and state court. That would be a reason for a federal court 
in New York entertaining a federal cause of action to borrow standards 
from New York law concerning matters of court administration, even 
though New York officials do not want their law to be used. 
Nevertheless, such vertical borrowing considerations are ignored in 
federal question cases. The reason, I think, is that the duty to ensure 
uniformity between federal and state courts when entertaining federal 
causes of action is thought to fall upon state courts. The matter therefore 
falls under the “reverse-Erie” rubric rather than being an Erie problem.43 
Question 3: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the 
issue demanded by the U.S. Constitution? 
At this stage one should identify the issue faced by the federal court 
entertaining the non-federal cause of action. Given Erie’s rejection of a 
Swiftian approach to the general common law, the issue is usually not 
going to concern the content of the plaintiff’s non-federal cause of action. 
It will concern court administration, such as how long the plaintiff can 
wait before bringing suit without being dismissed as time-barred or how 
specific the plaintiff should be in his complaint. There is an Erie problem 
when the court is choosing between an independent federal standard and 
a standard drawn from some other sovereign’s law to decide the issue. 
As we have seen, separation-of-powers considerations can compel a 
federal court to use an independent federal standard, whatever the court’s 
own judgment about the relative weight of sovereignty, borrowing, and 
countervailing considerations. This is obviously the case when a federal 
constitutional provision tells the federal court to use a federal standard. 
The court is bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard. 
Assume a federal court in California is entertaining a Nevada 
common law action in which the amount in controversy is $100,000. The 
Seventh Amendment tells it that the parties have a right to a jury trial. 
Because this right has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it does not apply in state court.44 If the Nevada action were 
43. See Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865, 1909–
17 (2013). 
44. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 
415, 432 (1996). 
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before a California or Nevada state court, the judge would be 
constitutionally permitted to act as the finder of fact. 
It follows that the federal court must provide a right to a jury trial 
even if sovereignty and borrowing considerations recommend otherwise. 
It may be that Nevada officials want the Nevada action to be adjudicated 
in federal court by a judge. That does not matter—the federal court is 
forbidden to take this sovereignty consideration into account. It may also 
be that the difference between the way the Nevada action would be 
litigated in federal and state court in California will cause forum shopping. 
That also does not matter—the federal court is forbidden to take this 
borrowing consideration into account. 
There remains the question of whether a federal constitutional 
provision does indeed direct a federal court to decide an issue according 
to a federal standard. If it doesn’t (and no other federal enacted law directs 
the federal court to use the federal standard), then the decision to use the 
federal standard is the product of common law reasoning.45 The Supreme 
Court has discussed when a federal statute and FRCP direct a federal court 
to decide an issue according to a federal standard—placing the federal 
court in the statutory or FRCP Erie “track.” But, to my knowledge, it has 
not given us guidance in determining whether an Erie problem falls in the 
constitutional track. 
To repeat, if a provision of the United States Constitution directs the 
federal court to decide the issue using an independent federal standard, 
then the court must use the federal standard. If the answer is no, then one 
moves on to consider whether any other federal enacted law ties the 
federal court’s hands. 
Question 4: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the 
issue demanded by a federal statute? 
If a federal statute directs a federal court to use an independent 
federal standard to decide the issue and the statute is constitutional, the 
court is again bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard. By 
enacting the statute, Congress has chosen to favor countervailing 
considerations recommending the federal standard over sovereignty or 
borrowing considerations and the federal court must defer to its judgment. 
45. E.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 n.10 (1958) (treating
the question of whether an issue should be decided by a judge or a jury as falling in the common law 
Erie track). 
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Notice that how one describes the effect of the statute depends upon 
whether sovereignty or borrowing considerations are defeated. If 
sovereignty considerations are defeated, the statute preempts state or 
foreign law.46 If borrowing considerations are defeated, there is no 
preemption, for state or foreign law did not purport to apply in the first 
place. Instead the federal statute repeals any past federal law on the 
matter—in particular, any federal common law that borrowed standards 
from another sovereign’s law—and prohibits federal courts from 
engaging in future federal common lawmaking that engages in such 
borrowing. 
The fact that putting an Erie problem in the statutory track may not 
mean that any state or foreign law is preempted can help explain why the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on preemption—which arguably includes 
the demand that federal statutes be read narrowly to avoid having a 
preemptive effect on state47 (and perhaps foreign48) law—is not generally 
referred to in an Erie context. The Court has instead said that an Erie 
problem falls within the statutory track just so long as the statute is 
“sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute.”49 
Notice that a federal statute might direct a federal court to use an 
independent federal standard not by identifying the standard to be used, 
but by directing the federal court to consider federal interests and come 
up with the standard itself through common law reasoning.50 When the 
effect of the statute is to override sovereignty considerations, this amounts 
to “field” preemption.51 State or foreign law is displaced and the federal 
court is directed to fill the void with federal common law. When the 
statute’s effect is only to override borrowing considerations, there is no 
field preemption. Federal common law applies even before the statute is 
enacted. What the statute does is remove borrowing considerations from 
46. For an article that looks at Erie problems in the statutory and FRCP track from the
perspective of preemption, see Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with 
Two Stones, 90 IND. L.J. 1591 (2015). 
47. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
48. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (discussing a
presumption against extraterritoriality). See also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64 (1804) (discussing a presumption against preemption of international law). 
49. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1988). Another reason Supreme
Court jurisprudence on preemption is largely ignored in Erie problems is that even when there is 
preemption, its effect is limited. In the usual preemption context, state or foreign law is preempted in 
state as well as federal court. But in an Erie context the federal statute preempts state or foreign law 
only in federal court. 
50. See, e.g., id. See also Rensberger, supra note 46, at 1602–03. 
51. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480–81 (2018); Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992).  
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the federal policies that federal courts should take into account when 
creating federal common law rules for the issue. 
Question 5: Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure? 
If a federal statute demands that the federal court use an independent 
federal standard for the issue, the only remaining question is whether the 
statute is constitutional. Here the Supreme Court has attributed broad 
powers to Congress to regulate the activities of federal district courts. The 
only thing that matters, as the Court in Hanna has told us, is that the issue 
regulated is “rationally capable of classification” as procedure.52 
The source of this broad authority is the power to establish the lower 
federal courts, combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause.53 A 
neglected issue is the role of other constitutional provisions empowering 
Congress, such as the Commerce Clause. It is true that if the Commerce 
Clause is used to create the federal cause of action upon which the plaintiff 
sues, then we are no longer facing an Erie problem (see Question 2). But 
the Commerce Clause might be the source of power to regulate the 
activities of federal courts when entertaining non-federal causes of 
action.54 There has been little discussion of this matter. 
There has also been little discussion of what the Hanna test actually 
means. The word “procedure” is not being used with the meaning I 
identified above.55 If it were, the Hanna test would be satisfied if the 
statute were meant to apply only in federal court. That would allow a 
federal statute to replace the entire content of the non-federal cause of 
action, so long as the replacement did not purport to extend to state or 
foreign courts. Instead it is an issue, rather than a law, that is being 
characterized as procedure. It appears that characterizing an issue as 
procedure means treating it as concerning the means by which a 
preexisting cause of action is litigated, rather than the content of the cause 
of action itself. 
One benefit of the Hanna test is that it frees a federal court from 
being constitutionally compelled to speculate about the substantive nature 
of state or foreign law. It can adopt the forum-law approach to 
substance/procedure questions in statutory track Erie problems. Still, one 
wonders whether the Supreme Court would stick to the Hanna test when 
52. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
53. Id. at 472–74. 
54. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (using
Commerce Clause to justify constitutionality of Federal Arbitration Act). 
55. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
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a federal statute overrides an explicitly substantive standard that is bound 
up with a state or foreign cause of action. Imagine that Pennsylvania’s 
wrongful death statute says that the two-year time limit for the action is 
meant to follow it into federal, sister-state, and foreign courts. Could 
Congress really pass a three-year statute of limitations for wrongful death 
actions that would allow the Pennsylvania action to be brought in federal 
court after two years had passed? How can one understand the statute as 
concerning the means by which the Pennsylvania action is litigated in 
federal court when the statute displaces part of the cause of action itself? 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed such cases, we don’t 
really know that much about when Congress’s goal of regulating the 
activities of federal courts can override substantive state and foreign law. 
In this respect, however, the situation is similar to state court, for the 
Supreme Court has also failed to answer when a state’s interest in 
regulating the activities of its courts can override substantive sister-state 
or foreign law.56 
If we take the Supreme Court at its word in Hanna, however, the fact 
that the issue regulated by the federal statute is rationally classifiable as 
procedure means the federal standard in the statute must be used. If the 
issue cannot be so characterized, the statute is unconstitutional.57 The 
failure of the statute to pass the Hanna test suggests that it improperly 
sought to regulate the content of the non-federal cause of action.58 If so, 
then the court should apply the relevant non-federal law. 
56. For example, the Supreme Court has not told us whether a forum state may prefer its longer 
statute of limitations over a substantive sister state limitations period. The closest it has come is Sun 
Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), which told us only that the court had the power to apply its 
statute of limitations in the absence of competing substantive sister state law. Id. at 729 n.3.   
57. Unless some other source of congressional power, such as the Commerce Clause, is relied 
upon.  
58. Actually, it is not clear that Congress’s purpose would be improper if the state did not
consider its view about the standard to be substantive. Consider Georgia, which remains committed 
to a Swiftian view of the common law. It apparently thinks that the common law standard prevailing 
in Georgia is a matter of fact concerning which federal courts may come to their own judgment. What 
if Congress decided to take the matter away from federal courts and answer by statute what the federal 
view of the common law standard in Georgia is? (Notice that the statute would only tell federal courts 
what to do with such cases—it would not purport to bind state courts.) Since Georgia does not 
consider its standard to be substantive, it is hard to see how it could complain. And yet Hanna would 
be violated, for the issue the statute regulates is the content of the non-federal cause of action, not 
mere questions of court administration. 
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Question 6: Is the use of an independent federal standard for the 
issue demanded by a FRCP? 
If no federal constitutional provision or federal statute demands an 
independent federal standard for the issue, one moves on to ask whether 
a FRCP makes that demand. If a FRCP directs the federal court to use an 
independent federal standard, and the FRCP is valid—in the sense that it 
is within Congress’s power and within the power that Congress has 
delegated to the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act (REA)—
the court is again bound to comply, even if sovereignty and borrowing 
considerations would recommend using another sovereign’s standard. By 
enacting the FRCP, the Supreme Court has chosen to favor countervailing 
considerations over sovereignty and borrowing considerations, and the 
federal court must defer to its judgment. If it is sovereignty considerations 
that are overridden, the FRCP preempts state or foreign law. If it is 
borrowing considerations that are overridden, the FRCP repeals any past 
federal common law that borrows standards from another sovereign’s law 
and prohibits any future creation of federal common law that engages in 
such borrowing. 
One would think that the test here would be similar to what it is in 
the statutory context. At times the Court has suggested as much. The 
question is solely “whether the scope of the [FRCP] in fact is sufficiently 
broad to control the issue.”59 There is no need to read FRCPs narrowly to 
avoid conflict with state (or presumably foreign) regulatory interests. But 
the Court has also suggested that the scope of FRCPs should be read with 
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”60 Part of 
the problem, as we shall see, is that the scope of the substantive right 
limitation in the REA is itself a matter of some dispute. The idea that 
FRCPs should be read in keeping with limitations imposed by the REA is 
hardly surprising. The problem is that it is not clear what those limitations 
are. 
The Court also seems conflicted about the possibility of a FRCP’s 
removing state or foreign standards from consideration in an area and 
directing federal courts to fill the area in with independent federal 
common law standards arrived at by considering relevant federal interests. 
Officially the Court demands a “direct collision” between the FRCP and 
the competing state or foreign standards to put the Erie problem in the 
59. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980). 
60. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 437 n.22 (1996). 
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FRCP track.61 So understood, a FRCP cannot direct a federal court to 
create an independent federal common law rule. But it seems clear that, at 
times, something like that is indeed taking place.62 
Question 7: Is the issue rationally classifiable as procedure? 
If a FRCP in fact directs a federal court to use an independent federal 
standard, the next question is whether the FRCP is valid. Congress cannot 
delegate power to the Supreme Court that Congress does not itself 
possess. Therefore, the matter regulated by the FRCP must be rationally 
classifiable as procedure. (See Question 5.) If it is not, the FRCP must 
have sought to regulate the content of the non-federal cause of action 
being sued upon. The federal court should apply the relevant non-federal 
law. 
Question 8: Does the way that the FRCP regulates the issue 
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive state or foreign rights? 
Even if the FRCP is within Congress’s power, it will still be invalid 
if it violates the substantive rights limitation in the REA. The REA gives 
over Congress’s power to regulate lower federal courts to the Supreme 
Court, subject to the requirement that any FRCP the Supreme Court 
creates does not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”63 
Notice that a FRCP apparently can be invalid because it abridges, 
enlarges, or modifies foreign or even federal substantive rights as much 
as state substantive rights. We can ignore federal substantive rights, for 
that would take us outside the scope of an Erie problem.64 But there 
appears to be no reason that an FRCP cannot be invalid because of its 
effect on foreign substantive rights. The role of foreign rights in 
connection with FRCPs is another gap in the Erie literature. 
The substantive rights limitation protects sovereignty considerations, 
not borrowing considerations. If the Erie problem is in the FRCP track, 
federal policies in favor of borrowing standards used by a forum state 
court are already overridden. The only concern is whether the FRCP 
61. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749, 750 n.9. 
62. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities 
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25–52 (2010). 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
64. There would be no Erie problem, because the choice the federal court would be facing
would be between the federal standard in the FRCP and the federal standard in the federal substantive 
right. 
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overrides a state’s or foreign nation’s desire that its standard be used in 
federal court. So understood, the limitation appears to force federal courts 
to attend to the substantive nature of state or foreign law. But very early 
on, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the limitation in a manner 
that freed federal courts from having to answer many substance/procedure 
questions. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,65 the Court made it clear that a 
right can be substantive for the purposes of the limitation only if it is tied 
to the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues. The right cannot be 
based on state or foreign law unrelated to the cause of action, even if the 
relevant state or foreign sovereign legitimately wishes its law to apply in 
federal court. 
Sibbach concerned the validity of FRCP 35, which permits a federal 
court to order a party to submit to a physical or mental examination. The 
plaintiff was suing under Indiana negligence law in federal court in 
Illinois. Illinois law would not allow such an examination, whereas 
Indiana law would. It is not implausible that Illinois officials would 
legitimately want the privacy protections of Illinois law to extend to 
federal courts in Illinois, provided that the invasion of privacy would 
occur within that state.66 But the Court held such concerns to be irrelevant 
to the validity of Rule 35 because they were not tied to the Indiana cause 
of action upon which the plaintiff sued. This reading appears to still be 
accepted by the Court.67 Thus, we can consider the Court to have adopted 
the forum-law solution to substance/procedure questions when the state 
or foreign standards at issue are not bound up with the cause of action. 
Even if these standards are substantive—in the sense that the relevant 
officials of the state or foreign nation would want them to be used in 
federal court—forum law (that is, the FRCP) is assumed to preempt them. 
What is contested on the Court is whether a state or foreign standard 
can be a substantive right for the purposes of the limitation in the REA if 
the relevant state or foreign officials want the standard to follow their 
cause of action into other court systems. Here the Sibbach Court also 
adopted the forum-law approach.68 As long as the FRCP, by its terms, 
regulates the means of litigating a cause of action in federal court, rather 
than purporting to determine the content of the cause of action, the FRCP 
65. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
66. I have argued that a state cannot have a legitimate sovereignty interest in its laws extending 
solely to federal court. The scope of its interest must be on the basis of a criterion that could, in 
principle, extend to a sister state court as well. See generally Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 73 (2014). The fact that the invasion of privacy occurred in Illinois would be 
such a criterion. 
67. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
68. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13–14. 
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is valid even if the interests of the state or foreign nation that created the 
action are seriously compromised. Thus, one need not consider whether 
state or foreign standards are substantive. All one needs to consider is the 
purpose of the FRCP. It would follow that a FRCP could include a three-
year time limit for wrongful death actions, even when it overrode an 
explicitly substantive two-year limit in the state or foreign statute creating 
the action. 
Justice Scalia adopted Sibbach’s forum-law approach in his plurality 
opinion in Shady Grove. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, adopted a 
scrupulous approach, in which the federal court undertakes a searching 
inquiry into whether the state or foreign nation that created the cause of 
action would want its standard to follow the action into federal court.69 
This has the benefit of showing respect for state and foreign regulatory 
interests, but it greatly increases the administrative burden on federal 
courts. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Shady Grove, adopted a rule-
of-thumb approach, according to which a statute that falls within a 
nominally procedural code (as the New York law at issue did) is 
presumptively procedural in the absence of persuasive evidence that it is 
substantive.70 Stevens’s approach is generally taken to be controlling, but 
the main point for our purposes is that the disagreement on the Court is 
precisely what one would expect given the substance/procedure question 
it faced. 
Notice that when one considers whether a FRCP abridges, enlarges, 
or modifies state or foreign substantive rights in a diversity case, the only 
substantive rights one considers are those that are tied to the cause of 
action identified by the forum’s choice-of-law rules, as required by 
Klaxon. (Whether Klaxon applies in jurisdictional contexts other than 
diversity, however, is a matter that needs to be addressed independently.) 
Thus, it is entirely possible for a FRCP to be valid in a diversity case even 
though it abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right, so long as the 
cause of action to which the substantive right belongs would not be chosen 
by a forum state court. 
To sum up, if the FRCP abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive 
right tied to the cause of action, then the FRCP is invalid (or should be 
reread more narrowly to avoid the conflict with the state or foreign 
substantive law).71 The issue must be decided according to the relevant 
state or foreign substantive law. But if the FRCP does not abridge, enlarge, 
69. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 444–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 431–36.
71. See, e.g., id. at 437. 
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or modify substantive rights, the federal standard in the FRCP must be 
used, even if sovereignty or borrowing considerations recommend using 
a standard from another jurisdiction’s law. 
Question 9: Is there a state or foreign standard bound up with the 
cause action upon which the plaintiff sues? 
If the use of the federal standard is not demanded by federal enacted 
law, we are not yet in the federal common law track, for federal enacted 
law might tie the federal court’s hands in the opposite direction, that is, 
by demanding that it use the competing state or foreign standard. The 
language of Question 9 is drawn from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Cooperative, Inc.,72, which suggests that in the absence of federal enacted 
law to the contrary, a federal court is constitutionally required to use a 
state (and presumably foreign) legal standard for an issue if the standard 
is bound up with the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues. The 
reasons for applying the state or foreign standard are clearly sovereignty 
considerations, for the focus is on whether state or foreign officials want 
the standard to follow their cause of action into other court systems. 
Notice that in a diversity case one is concerned only about the substantive 
nature of a standard that is bound up with what a forum state court would 
choose as the cause of action, due to Klaxon. It is apparently possible, 
therefore, for a federal court sitting in diversity to apply federal common 
law that preempts a standard bound up with an applicable state or foreign 
cause of action, provided that a forum state court would have chosen a 
different cause of action. 
Federal courts’ inability to preempt state or foreign law with federal 
common law stands in contrast to Congress, which, as we have seen, can 
preempt such law, as long as the issue can rationally be characterized as 
procedure. It is not strange that a federal court’s power to preempt state 
or foreign law would be more limited than Congress’s (although it would 
appear to be more accurate to describe this restriction not as constitutional 
in its source, but as a congressional demand).73 But it is strange that 
federal courts should always be obligated to use these bound-up state or 
foreign standards, no matter what the countervailing federal interests in 
favor of the independent federal common law rule happen to be. What if 
a state bound up its service rules with its cause of action? Would a federal 
72. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
73. After all, Congress could surely give federal courts the freedom to create federal common 
law in any circumstance where Congress itself could regulate the matter. 
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court entertaining the action be constitutionally prohibited from coming 
up with an independent federal common law rule concerning service? 
Finally, there is no guidance about how federal courts are to identify 
whether the Byrd bound-up test is met. It clearly requires a federal court 
to speculate about the substantive nature of state and foreign law. The 
forum-law approach to substance/procedure questions is rejected. If the 
scrupulous approach is used, the burden on federal courts will be 
significant. The fact that Stevens’s rule-of-thumb approach is probably 
controlling in connection with the substantive rights limitation in the REA 
is a reason to think that it would be used here too. 
Question 10: Do the purposes standing behind the statute granting 
the federal court jurisdiction generate policies of vertical uniformity 
with the state court where the non-federal action would have been 
brought but for federal jurisdiction? 
It appears that after one has passed the Byrd bound-up test, all 
sovereignty considerations are left behind. The issue will be regulated by 
federal common law and the question is solely what the content of that 
law will be—whether it will use an independent federal standard or 
borrow the standard that would be used by the state court where the action 
would have been brought had there been no federal jurisdiction. As we 
have seen, however, a state or foreign nation can have legitimate 
regulatory interests in the activity of federal courts that are unrelated to 
the cause of action. One would think that such sovereignty considerations 
should have some capacity to weigh against a federal court’s decision to 
apply an independent federal standard. And yet, as the Court’s Erie 
jurisprudence now stands, there is no place for them to be taken into 
account.74 We must assume they have been preempted by federal common 
law. 
Setting aside sovereignty considerations, we now turn to the 
borrowing considerations that are so important in the common law (or 
“relatively-unguided”) Erie track. In diversity cases these have been 
described as the “twin aims of Erie.” According to the twin aims, a federal 
court sitting in diversity should use the standard that would be used by a 
forum state court if the difference between it and an independent federal 
standard would lead to forum shopping and the inequitable administration 
74. Assume, for example, that a New York state court would apply Oregon’s attorney-client 
privilege law to Oregon communications. Borrowing considerations will recommend that a federal 
court in New York use Oregon’s standards too. But isn’t Oregon’s interest in its law applying in 
federal court also relevant? 
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of the laws.75 The truth is that a federal court should use the standard that 
would be used, not necessarily by a forum state court, but by the state 
court where the action would have been brought but for diversity 
jurisdiction. It takes further argument to conclude that this is a forum state 
court (see Question 12). For the moment, however, I will assume that the 
relevant state court is that of the forum state. 
It is crucial to understand that the twin aims are borrowing 
considerations, not sovereignty considerations. They cannot possibly be 
sovereignty considerations, for state law is used even on the assumption 
that the relevant state’s officials don’t care whether their law is used in 
federal court. Woods is a particularly clear example of this phenomenon, 
but countless others can be found. For example, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York,76 the Supreme Court told a federal court sitting in diversity in New 
York that it had to use New York’s statute of limitations without making 
any attempt to determine what New York officials thought about the 
matter. 
One important benefit of treating the twin aims as borrowing rather 
than sovereignty considerations is that it eases the pressure on federal 
courts facing common law track Erie problems. Unless sovereignty 
considerations come into play, the law that is applied is federal and the 
question is solely what standard best serves the balance of federal 
interests. To make a mistake means that the federal court has created a 
badly designed federal common law rule, with its costs felt only by the 
federal government. It has not infringed upon state or foreign sovereignty. 
It is also less worrisome if, as is sometimes the case, the federal court 
creates a curious chimera standard, in which state and federal standards 
are blended together.77 Understood as an exercise in respect for state 
sovereignty, it is hard to see how such a result could be correct. But it 
makes much more sense if we understand the standard as the product of 
balancing competing federal interests. 
Although looking at the twin aims as borrowing considerations goes 
a long way toward making sense of them, a host of questions still remain. 
The first is where they come from. The usual answer is the Rules of 
75. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
76. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
77. This is a common criticism of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415
(1996). See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 103 (2011); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An 
Essay on What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); C. Douglas 
Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 
269–70 (1997).  
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Decision Act (RDA),78 which states that “[t]he laws of the several states, 
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of 
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of 
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where 
they apply.”79 But no one who gives the matter any serious thought can 
be satisfied with this response. 
Setting aside the substantial historical evidence against such a 
position,80 it is incompatible with the language of the RDA. First of all, 
the RDA extends to all civil actions in the courts of the United States, 
including actions brought under federal law. If the twin aims somehow 
came from the RDA, a federal court entertaining a federal cause of action 
would be bound by the twin aims too: if an issue of court administration 
was not covered by federal enacted law, it would have to use the standards 
that would be used by a forum state court. But that isn’t so. Second, under 
the twin aims a federal court can be required to use foreign standards if 
they would be used by a forum state court. But the RDA says nothing 
about foreign law. Third, the RDA’s language is categorical, but the twin 
aims are not. The RDA says that state law “shall be regarded as rules of 
decision,” not that it shall be if the difference between state and federal 
standards leads to forum shopping and the inequitable administration of 
the laws. Fourth, the RDA says only that state law shall be used in cases 
where it applies. State law applies when the state’s authorities would say 
it does. But the twin aims are about state law standards being used when 
state law does not apply, that is, when state authorities would not say their 
law should be used in federal court. Fifth, the RDA says vaguely that the 
“the laws of the several states” shall be used. But which state? There is no 
suggestion that the answer is the law that would be used by a forum state 
court. 
78. E.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–23 (1974); 
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39–41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). This is the Act in its current form, which is not different from the 
original form in any respect relevant here. 
80. The RDA was probably not intended to be a restriction on federal courts’ power to create
common law. As Wilfred Ritz has put it, the Act—by referring generally to “the laws of the several 
states”—is simply a “direction to the national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from 
English law.” WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING 
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 148 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 
1990). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, 
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 106–08 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, 
Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 
2137–38 (2008). The Act makes it clear that American rather than English law should be used in 
federal courts. But it says nothing about the division of common lawmaking power between federal 
and state courts. 
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Let us therefore set aside the RDA as a possible source of the twin 
aims. To which statute should one look then? In fact, it is not absolutely 
necessary to ground the twin aims in any enacted law. The policies upon 
which courts rely when making common law rules (including policies 
recommending borrowing standards from other sovereigns’ laws) often 
lack such a source. Nevertheless, I think that borrowing considerations in 
Erie problems can profitably be understood as grounded in the statute 
giving the federal court jurisdiction over the non-federal cause of action.81 
In diversity cases, that is, of course, the diversity statute.82 It follows that 
the twin aims might not be relevant for other forms of federal jurisdiction. 
The argument for vertical uniformity depends upon the form of federal 
jurisdiction at issue. 
The diversity statute can be understood as recommending vertical 
uniformity according to the following plausible argument: The purpose of 
diversity, it is usually said, is to provide an out-of-state party with a forum 
free from the bias in favor of locals that might exist in state court.83 If that 
is the case, there are good reasons for federal courts sitting in diversity to 
borrow standards for court administration from a forum state court. 
Assume federal courts used a federal common law limitations period that 
is shorter than that used by a forum state court. An out-of-state plaintiff 
who was genuinely worried about bias in state court, but who had waited 
longer than the federal limitations period, would be forced to remain in 
state court, thereby frustrating the purposes of diversity. In addition, a 
defendant who was not worried about bias in state court might remove to 
federal court solely to get the plaintiff’s action dismissed as time-barred, 
thereby wasting the federal forum on matters unrelated to the purpose of 
diversity. In short, vertical uniformity of court administration serves the 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction. 
Although the purposes of federal jurisdiction for non-federal actions 
can generate borrowing considerations, which must be taken into account 
when federal courts create federal common law rules of court 
administering for such actions, it is important to recognize that these 
considerations can be overridden by federal enacted law. It is true that 
federal statutes and FRCPs that have standards different from those used 
in a forum state court will frustrate the purposes of diversity, for example, 
81. See Green, supra note 43, at 1888–90. Other scholars have come to the same conclusion.
See Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341 (2017). 
82. 28 U.S.C § 1332(a)-(c) (2012). 
83. E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 
315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Borchers, supra note 80, at 79–80; John P. Frank, 
Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22–28 (1948). 
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by discouraging those who are legitimately worried about state court bias 
from seeking out a federal forum. But it is a lawmaker’s prerogative to 
create laws that frustrate the purposes of earlier laws. 
Another puzzling question is what the term “inequitable 
administration of the laws” means. Assume that a federal court sitting in 
diversity in New York is entertaining a New York cause of action. If it 
comes up with its own limitations period for the action rather than using 
New York’s limitations period, that is apparently the inequitable 
administration of the laws. But when a state court in Pennsylvania uses 
Pennsylvania’s limitations period for that same New York action, law is 
not inequitably administered. Why not? The reason cannot be that New 
York wants the limitations period to follow its cause of action into federal 
court in New York but not into state court in Pennsylvania, for the federal 
court must use New York’s limitations period even if New York officials 
don’t care whether it is used. Sovereignty considerations are not in play. 
Furthermore, why is it the inequitable administration of the laws if a 
federal court comes up with its own common law limitations period for 
the New York action, but not if Congress creates a statute of limitations 
for the action? 
Again, I think the answer can be found in the purposes of diversity. 
Congress created diversity jurisdiction to provide a forum free from the 
bias that might exist in state court. Its purpose was not to license federal 
courts to create independent federal common law standards for court 
administration in the light of any conceivable federal interest.84 
Presumptively the federal common law standard they use should be the 
same as that of the forum state. If they ignore this policy of vertical 
uniformity and create a limitations period different from the one used in 
state court, a wrong has been done to the party disadvantaged by the 
federal period. She is being treated differently from someone who could 
remain in state court, without a valid reason. That is the inequitable 
administration of the laws. But since the wrong she suffers exists because 
the federal court ignored a congressional policy of vertical uniformity, no 
wrong is done to her if Congress abandons that policy by enacting a statute 
of limitations. 
Tying the inequity to the purposes of diversity also explains why 
there is no inequity when a Pennsylvania state court uses its own 
limitations period for the New York action. Diversity exists to solve a 
84. Notice that this policy exists even if there is no possibility of forum shopping (because
Congress has given federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the non-federal cause of action). Thus, 
Chief Justice Warren had good reason in Hanna to identify the inequitable administration of the laws 
as a separate consideration.   
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problem with jurisdiction in state court, and federal courts making 
common law rules concerning court administration in diversity cases need 
to take that fact into account. But the Pennsylvania legislature did not give 
Pennsylvania state courts jurisdiction over New York causes of action 
solely as a means of avoiding some problem with jurisdiction in New 
York state court. Its purposes in allowing New York actions into 
Pennsylvania state court are much broader. As a result, Pennsylvania state 
courts have few, if any, reasons to borrow standards from New York state 
courts. 
What about supplemental jurisdiction? Do its purposes—in 
combination with the purposes of the statute that provided the federal 
court with original jurisdiction—generate policies of vertical uniformity, 
as has been widely assumed?85 Supplemental jurisdiction exists to avoid 
the inefficiency that would otherwise occur if non-federal actions without 
their own source of federal jurisdiction had to be brought in state court. 
Furthermore, supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases helps foster the 
purposes of diversity. If there were no supplemental jurisdiction, the cost 
of duplicative litigation might discourage a party who is worried about 
bias in state court from seeking out the protection of a federal forum for 
her diversity actions.86 
What is more, since the actions with diversity jurisdiction and those 
with supplemental jurisdiction can be litigated together in federal court, 
vertical uniformity is needed or the purposes of diversity will be 
frustrated. Assume that the federal court applied an independent federal 
common law limitations period to an action with supplemental 
jurisdiction that is shorter than that used in a forum state court. The 
plaintiff might not seek out a federal forum—despite being worried about 
state court bias—because of this disadvantageous federal law. And the 
defendant might seek out a federal forum even though she had no worry 
about state court bias.87 Similar frustration of the purposes of diversity 
would occur if the federal court used an independent federal common law 
limitations period for an action with supplemental jurisdiction that was 
85. E.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Godin v. Schencks 
629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
86. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 
87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (1999); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
(1966); Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the 
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 449 (1991). 
87. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is there Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity? 
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 385–87 (1980).  
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/2
2018] ERIE DOCTRINE FLOWCHART 251 
longer than that used by a forum state court. To ensure that choices of a 
federal forum are made for the right reason, procedural uniformity 
between federal and forum state court concerning actions with 
supplemental jurisdiction is needed. 
Furthermore, even if concerns about forum shopping are set aside, a 
federal court’s application of a different limitations period would be the 
inequitable administration of the laws. Congress created supplemental 
jurisdiction in diversity cases to overcome the inefficiency of separate 
litigation in state court and to foster the purposes of diversity. There is no 
reason to think that this was a license to federal courts to create 
independent federal common law standards of court administration in the 
light of any conceivable federal interest. To the extent that a federal court 
ignores this policy of vertical uniformity, it is inequitably administering 
the laws.88 
To repeat, at this stage the federal court should consider the source 
of federal jurisdiction and determine whether there are federal policies of 
vertical uniformity. In diversity cases there are such policies, known as 
the twin aims of Erie, which extend to actions with supplemental 
jurisdiction. Whether there are such policies in connection with other 
forms of federal jurisdiction needs to be assessed independently. The fact 
that a non-federal cause of action is being entertained by the federal court 
is not on its own a reason to conclude that such policies are implicated. 
Only a confusion between sovereignty and borrowing considerations 
would lead one to conclude otherwise. When a plaintiff sues on a non-
federal action in federal court, that is indeed a reason to worry about 
sovereignty considerations—the state or foreign nation that created the 
action may want a standard to follow it into federal court. But we have 
left sovereignty considerations aside. The question now is solely whether 
there are federal policies in favor of borrowing standards that would be 
used by a forum state court. That depends upon why Congress gave the 
federal court jurisdiction over the non-federal action. 
A proper understanding of the twin aims allows us to make sense of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Klaxon.89 I think it is clear that borrowing 
considerations, not sovereignty considerations, are what motivated 
Klaxon. Choice-of-law rules are about identifying and choosing between 
sovereignty considerations. They allow a court to determine when a 
sovereign wants its law to be used and to decide which sovereign wins 
88. For the argument that policies of vertical uniformity exist concerning actions with
supplemental jurisdiction in federal question cases, see Green, supra note 43, at 1920–21. 
89. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
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when more than one has such a desire. To be sure, the forum state might 
be one of those sovereigns that wants its law to be used. But the reason a 
federal court uses the forum state’s choice-of-law rules cannot be because 
the forum state wants the federal court to do so.90 Even if it were true that 
New York wanted a federal court in New York to use a New York rule 
that picks New York law over Pennsylvania law, that would simply be a 
more emphatic way of saying that New York wants its law to be used.91 
Pennsylvania might have a similar desire that the federal court use a 
Pennsylvania rule that picks Pennsylvania law over New York law. How 
the federal court chooses between these sovereignty considerations 
remains, and the principles for choosing cannot be found in the law of the 
sovereigns the federal court is choosing between. The forum state’s 
choice-of-law rules are used by federal courts for federal reasons—in 
particular because of federal policies of vertical uniformity. 
We can also see why Klaxon is such a controversial case. With 
Klaxon in place, borrowing considerations can lead a federal court to 
choose against the weight of sovereignty considerations. One’s view 
about Klaxon essentially depends upon how important one thinks getting 
sovereignty considerations right is compared to the policies of vertical 
uniformity derived from the purposes of federal jurisdiction. For my part, 
I think these policies are sufficiently weighty to make Klaxon justified, at 
least in diversity cases and for actions with supplemental jurisdiction in 
such cases. 
If the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction generates no 
policies of vertical uniformity, then the federal court is free to apply an 
independent federal common law standard for the issue. If the statute 
giving the federal court jurisdiction does generate policies of vertical 
uniformity, however, the federal court needs to keep these in mind when 
creating a federal common law rule for the issue. 
90. For a reading of Klaxon as concerning sovereignty considerations, see Kermit Roosevelt
III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2012).   
91. In fact, I very much doubt that state supreme courts, if asked, would say they want their
choice-of-law rules to be used in other court systems. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 4, at 
869–84. 
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Question 11: Is one of the reasons Congress created federal 
jurisdiction for the non-federal action an opposition to the standard that 
state courts would apply to the issue? 
Even if the purposes of federal jurisdiction generate general policies 
of vertical uniformity, a federal court will not have a reason to borrow 
standards from forum state courts if one of the problems federal 
jurisdiction is meant to solve is the standards that state courts would apply 
to the issue. For example, assume that Congress gave federal courts 
diversity jurisdiction, in part, to avoid state court bias against those from 
out of the state, as this bias expresses itself in the choice-of-law rules used 
in state court. If that is so, then Klaxon is wrongly decided, and federal 
courts should use independent federal common law standards concerning 
choice of law. Although I do not think such a conclusion is justified in 
connection with diversity jurisdiction, it is entirely possible that 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the Class Action Fairness Act was, in part, 
to provide a federal forum free from improper choice of law in state 
court.92 If so, federal courts with jurisdiction under the Act would be free 
to come up with independent federal common law rules for choice of law. 
Question 12: Can one identify the state court where the non-federal 
action would likely have been brought but for federal jurisdiction? 
I have occasionally spoken about policies of vertical uniformity as 
recommending borrowing those standards that would be used by a forum 
state court. This is not entirely accurate. They recommend borrowing 
standards from the state court where the action would have been brought 
but for federal jurisdiction. For this reason, one will not be able to borrow 
those standards if one cannot identify what that state court is. The 
(unspoken) assumption in diversity cases is that had there been no 
diversity jurisdiction the action would have proceeded in the court of the 
state where the federal court is located. When the defendants remove to 
federal court, this assumption is clearly correct, since that is where the 
case began.93 When the plaintiffs have chosen to sue in federal court, 
however, where the action would have been brought in the absence of 
federal jurisdiction is a matter of some speculation. The plaintiffs’ choice 
could have been between a federal court in one state (say, New York) and 
92. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal
Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847 (2017). 
93. This is true even if there is subsequent transfer to another federal district court. E.g., Van 
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
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a state court in another state (Pennsylvania). In such a case, the twin aims’ 
goal of avoiding forum shopping would be served if a federal court in New 
York borrowed standards that would be used by a Pennsylvania state court 
rather than a New York state court. In diversity cases, however, the 
Supreme Court has apparently assumed—probably justifiably—that 
plaintiffs making a choice between state and federal court usually choose 
between a federal and state court within the same state. 
But in some jurisdictional contexts, such as bankruptcy, the matter is 
more complicated. As an initial matter, let us assume that the purposes of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction generate policies of uniformity with the state court 
where the action would otherwise have been brought.94 Notice that such 
borrowing considerations are independent of sovereignty considerations, 
that is, the reasons that a federal court sitting in bankruptcy has to respect 
state standards that the state wants to be used in federal court.95 Borrowing 
considerations give a federal court reasons to use state standards even if 
the state’s officials don’t care whether they are used. 
How can one determine the consequences of these policies of vertical 
uniformity? A federal court sitting in bankruptcy will usually be in the 
district where the debtor resides.96 But it can take jurisdiction of actions 
against the debtor even if a state court where the federal court is located 
would not have personal jurisdiction.97 When the action had previously 
been filed in a state court, there is no problem. The federal court borrows 
standards from that court (which, it should be noted, is not necessarily in 
the forum state).98 Even if the action had not been previously filed in state 
court, the matter is not that difficult if all the parties are residents of the 
same state and the transaction at issue took place there. A court of that 
state (which will usually be the forum state) will very likely have been 
where the action would have been brought but for bankruptcy 
jurisdiction.99 In some cases, however, one cannot identify where the 
94. For such an argument, see Green, supra note 43, at 1922–25. In my discussion I speak of
a federal court sitting in bankruptcy, but my reasoning applies to a bankruptcy court too. 
95. See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Green, supra note 43, at 1922–23. 
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). 
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d). 
98. In re Coudert Bros., 673 F.3d 180, 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Connecticut
limitations period rather than New York’s period should be used for an action against the debtor, 
under either Connecticut or United Kingdom law, originally filed in state court in Connecticut, but 
ultimately entertained by bankruptcy court in New York). 
99. Green, supra note 43, at 1927–28; See In re Johnson, 453 B.R. 433 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(holding that a Florida statute forbidding a plaintiff to plead punitive damages until he offers evidence 
showing a reasonable basis for that relief should be used by a bankruptcy court in Florida entertaining 
an action under Florida law by bankruptcy trustee on behalf of Florida debtor against Florida 
defendant). 
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action would have been brought had there been no bankruptcy. If so, a 
federal court has no choice but to employ a federal common law standard 
for the issue. Keep in mind, however, that this is only a reason for the 
federal court not to borrow standards from a state court. It is not a reason 
for the federal court to ignore sovereignty considerations that recommend 
using state law. 
Question 13: Is the difference between the independent federal 
common law standard and the standard that would be used by the state 
court where the action would have been brought but for federal 
jurisdiction so significant that the federal court’s use of the independent 
federal standard would violate federal policies recommending vertical 
uniformity? 
At this point the court needs to identify the standard that would be 
used by the state court where the action would have been brought absent 
federal jurisdiction and a candidate independent federal common law 
standard, which is the one that would be used in the absence of any federal 
policies of vertical uniformity. The federal standard might have already 
been created in federal question cases, where federal courts are not bound 
by policies of vertical uniformity. Or federal courts might have created 
the standard in the context of Erie problems, without recognizing them as 
such and so ignoring the possibility that a state or foreign standard should 
have been used. 
It is also common for the federal standard to have never been 
articulated before, because federal courts simply have, as an unthinking 
matter, not done something that is demanded in a forum state court. In 
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,100 one could say that there was a federal 
common law standard under which out-of-state corporations did not have 
to register to do business before bringing suit, because federal courts 
simply did not make such a demand. But they never recognized that they 
had this standard until the defendant in Woods argued that Mississippi’s 
registration requirement should be used. 
Sometimes the content of the federal standard is a matter of first 
impression. There is no federal standard at all, not even as a judicial 
practice. It does not follow that the other sovereign’s standard should be 
used (as some flowcharts on Erie suggest). Rather, the federal court needs 
to come up with a candidate federal common law standard by looking to 
relevant federal interests, excluding policies of vertical uniformity. 
100.  337 U.S. 535 (1949).  
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The court then determines whether the difference between the 
standards violates policies of vertical uniformity. In diversity cases, the 
court asks the following two questions. First, would the difference lead to 
forum shopping, by discouraging a party worried about state court bias 
from going to federal court or by encouraging a party not worried about 
state court bias to seek out federal court? Second, would the difference 
result in the inequitable administration of the laws, because parties would 
be treated differently in a federal and a forum state court for no valid 
reason? If the federal policies of vertical uniformity are not violated or 
any violation is de minimis, the independent federal common law standard 
can be used. The example offered in Hanna is differences between a 
federal common law service rule and the forum state’s rule.101 If the 
federal policies of vertical uniformity are violated, that is a strong reason 
to borrow the standard from the relevant state court. 
Question 14: Are there sufficiently strong countervailing federal 
interests in favor of the independent federal standard, interests that 
would overcome federal policies in favor of vertical uniformity? 
The twin aims of Erie and other policies of vertical uniformity 
recommended by the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction are 
important. But they are not dispositive. They can be defeated by 
countervailing considerations, that is, sufficiently strong federal reasons 
in favor of an independent federal common law standard.102 The idea is 
that Congress did not command federal courts to borrow state standards. 
Rather, by creating federal jurisdiction it brought into being strong 
policies in favor of vertical uniformity, policies that can be overridden by 
other federal interests. 
Although identifying countervailing federal interests is not easy, they 
must be sufficiently strong to overcome the weight of policies of vertical 
uniformity. The simple convenience of uniform rules for court 
administration across the federal court system is not enough. An example 
of countervailing federal interests that were sufficiently strong are those 
101.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). 
 102.  Although the possibility of the twin aims’ being defeated by countervailing federal interests 
was not mentioned in Hanna; in Gasperini, the Court mentioned such interests as relevant in deciding 
common law Erie problems. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996). 
Furthermore, the Court also mentioned countervailing federal interests (although not Byrd by name) 
in Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001). They have also been 
relied upon by lower federal courts. E.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, 289 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 
2002); Moling v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 956, 975–76 (W.D. Tenn. 2011). 
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justifying federal courts’ choice of federal over forum state standards for 
forum non conveniens, discussed above.103 
IV. CONCLUSION
As the flowchart and explanations offered above have shown, 
solving Erie problems is a complicated matter. But in their essentials, Erie 
problems are like the choice-of-law problems faced by state courts. The 
only major difference is that borrowing considerations play a much larger 
role in Erie problems. This is because the purposes standing behind a 
congressional grant of federal jurisdiction over a non-federal action 
commonly recommend uniformity of procedure with the state court where 
the action would otherwise have been brought. No comparable borrowing 
considerations are generated when state law gives a state court jurisdiction 
over an action under sister-state or foreign law. Borrowing considerations 
are therefore rarer in the choice-of-law problems faced by state courts. 
When these borrowing considerations do exist in an Erie problem—
and, to repeat, they do so only when they can be justified by the purposes 
of the congressional grant of jurisdiction—they play an important role in 
determining the content of the federal common law procedural rules the 
federal court uses when entertaining the non-federal action. There is a 
reason for these rules to borrow content from the procedure of the state 
court where the non-federal action would otherwise have been brought. 
But the role of these federal borrowing considerations, although 
important, is not dispositive. They can be overridden by sufficiently 
strong countervailing federal interests in favor of an independent federal 
common law standard. 
103.  See supra text accompanying note 36. 
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